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Transaction Costs and Agricultural Nonpoint-Source
Water Pollution Control Policies
Rodney B.  W. Smith and Theodore D. Tomasi
Mechanism  design theory  is  used  to develop  the  properties of optimal  pollution  control
incentive schemes  in the presence of adverse selection,  moral hazard, and transaction costs.
The model presented here shows (a) with no deadweight costs (transaction  costs), first-best
allocations are always  possible; (h) in the presence  of transaction costs (caused  by raising
taxes),  only  second-best  allocations  are  feasible;  and  (c)  the conditions  under which  the
optimal  incentive scheme  implementing  second-best allocations will be a nonlinear tax, a
standard(s), or a combination of both taxes and standard(s).
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Introduction
Shortle and Dunn (hereafter  S-D) examined the relative efficiency of alternative policies to
control agricultural  nonpoint-source (NPS) pollution. In their model, the regulatory agency
cannot observe the amount of pollution runoff from a farm due to the high cost of  undertaking
this measurement:  a distinguishing  feature of NPS pollution. Moreover,  in S-D the farmer
knows his own profit function, but the regulator faces (prohibitively)  high costs identifying
all  of the relevant parameters  of the  farmer's profit function;  hence, there  is  asymmetric
information between the regulator and the farmer.  The regulator, however, is assumed to be
able  to monitor the farmer's  input levels.  Then, using a stochastic  model of runoff, infers
(imperfectly)  the amount of pollution runoff from the farm.I
Shortle  and  Dunn  showed,  using  a  model  of a  single  farm,  that  despite  the  lack of
information  in their model, the regulator  can induce a farmer to choose an ex ante efficient
level  of polluting  inputs.  This  can  be  done  using  an  incentive  scheme  directed  toward
management practices in the form of a tax, a nonlinear function of the inputs used. The tax
is equal to the expected environmental damages caused by the runoff.
In the S-D model,  no transaction costs are incurred  when implementing the regulatory
policy.  They clearly  recognize  this  omission when  summarizing  their  analysis  (p.  674).
"[S]etting aside  policy transaction costs...  allowing  for  both a  differential  information
structure  and  a  nonlinear  damage  cost  function  results  in a  situation  in which  only  an
appropriately specified management practice  incentive is optimal" (emphasis added). How-
ever, despite our tendency to ignore them, such costs are likely to exist.
It is common practice to ignore  the cost of implementing  a policy in economic analysis
and  to  focus  attention  on  the  (gross)  efficiency  implications  of alternative  regulatory
instruments.  The direct costs of raising funds and administering policies could be  "netted
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out" later in a policy analysis.  In this article we show that the existence of transaction costs
of implementing nonpoint pollution policy may be crucial in assessing the gross efficiency
implications of the alternative regulations. Specifically, we model transaction costs of  policy
implementation  as a proportional  extra cost incurred  when raising taxes. Then, contrary to
S-D's results, the regulator is not able to devise an incentive  scheme that induces a farmer I  2 to choose ex-ante efficient levels of a polluting input.
In addition to the management  practice incentive  scheme just discussed, S-D examined
the efficiency properties of implementing  farm management standards.3 They showed that
an optimal  management  standard-where  the same  input vector  is  assigned  to  the  firm
irrespective  of parameters of the profit function-never  dominates an optimal tax structure
in their model.  In  our model,  we  show that  a tax  scheme  is  not always  superior and  is
(second-best)  optimal  only  in  special  circumstances.  We  also  show  that,  in general,  the
regulator's  optimal regulatory  policy  is a  mixture of taxes and one or more  standards;  in
some cases it will consist solely of a standard.  A distinguishing feature of our model is that
the policy instrument choice is an endogenous one (Chambers).
Before proceeding, it is important that we clarify the scope and limitations of  our analysis.
First, the transaction costs we introduce are related only to those incurred by a government
agency implementing a policy. As noted by Dahlman,  externalities generally will not exist
at all  in the absence  of suitably  specified  transaction  costs. We maintain the existence  of
transaction costs which prohibit a fully decentralized resolution of the agricultural pollution
problem.
Second,  our  model,  as  well  as  S-D's  formal  model,  is  that  of a  single  farm.  S-D
acknowledge  the  importance  of considering  several  farms-which  may raise  additional
considerations of a second-best nature-but they do not resolve these issues, and neither do
we.  Considering multiple  sources  in the modeling  of optimal  incentive  schemes for NPS
pollution control remains  an important topic for research.
Third, we are not very creative  in our modeling of transaction  costs. However,  we are
not interested  in detailing  specific  transaction  costs per se; rather we  are  focused on the
implications of the existence of policy transaction  costs for the analysis of agricultural NPS
pollution regulation.  To introduce  transaction  costs we simply  append a constant propor-
tional  "social cost of funds" term that is meant to capture deadweight losses of distorting
taxes  and  other  costs  associated  with  taxation.  This approach  provides  a  proxy  for  the
detailed specification  of policy transaction  costs.
Our article is related to two strands of literature.  One regards the problem of regulating
agricultural NPS pollution when there is an inability to monitor farm emissions, uncertainty,
and  adverse  selection  (asymmetric  information regarding  the profit function).  We  follow
Griffin and Bromley and S-D in modeling these problems.  While the approach to incorpo-
rating  policy  transaction  costs  into  the analysis  is  not new,  having  been  developed  for
regulating a public firm,  its implications for agricultural NPS pollution regulation have not
been  described previously (Fudenberg and Tirole; Russell and Shogren).  The other strand
2For the class of transaction  costs  considered in this study,  first-best allocations cannot be achieved  by any policy, because
policy costs must be netted out. In this case, efficiency comparisons among instruments  are undertaken  in a second-best setting,
and hence,  policies that achieve an efficient  allocation in such a world would be second-best efficient.  However,  as a reviewer
observed, different specifications of transaction costs might generate different  policy implications. For instance, the (magnitude
of) transaction  costs associated with implementing a tax may be different  from those associated with implementing  a standard,
or the  policy  implications  associated  with  specific  types of transaction  costs may  differ  (e.g., do  transaction  costs  that are
independent  of tax levels  have the same  implications  as transaction costs that depend  on tax levels).
3They also examined incentive  schemes and standards directed  to estimated runoff and found that these are almost never as
good as a corresponding policy directed  to management practices.
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of literature  concerns the design of second-best  environmental  policies in the presence  of
transaction costs, or when other distorting taxes exist in the economy.4
The Basic Problem
Our specification of the model closely follows that of Shortle and Dunn.5 In the absence of
regulation, a profit-maximizing farmer chooses an input x e R+ to maximize
n(x,0)= E{n(x,w,0)}.
Here, w, an ex post realization of a random variable that is unknown to the farmer at the time
x,  is  chosen  (for  example,  rainfall);  Ew is  the expectations  operator  (with respect to  the
random variable w); and 0 is a scalar index of farmer profitability (called the farmer's "type")
known  to the farmer but not to the regulator.  We refer to a farmer with profitability index
equal to 0  as a type-0  farmer. The parameter 0 might be interpreted as an index of a farmer's
managerial ability or an index of soil quality or a composite  index of both. The expression
fi(x, w, 0)is the profit a type-0 farmer receives  when using x units of the input and the state
of nature  w occurs, and n(x, 0)  is the expected profit to a type-0 farmer's using x units of
the input.  From the regulator's  perspective,  0 is  a random  variable  with density function
k(0), the support of 0 is  = [0,  ], and Jk(0)  dO = 1. Hence, there is asymmetric informa-
tion between the farmer and the regulator concerning the value of 0.
Assumption 1: (i) k(0) > 0 for all 0 e  9;  (ii) for all w, n  is strictly concave and thrice
continuously differentiable  in x and 0;  and (iii)  n  Io  (.) > 0.
Assumption  1 part (i) guarantees there  is no division by zero later in the text, and part
(ii) guarantees  that expected profits  n  are  strictly concave in x and 0 . Assumption  I part
(iii) says that marginal profits increase with higher values of 0:  in other words, the shadow
value of the input is nondecreasing  in 0,  or similarly,  the higher the value of 0;  the more
efficient  is the farmer.  The implications and importance of Assumption  1 part (iii) will be
discussed in the subsequent discussion on truthtelling.
The regulator's  understanding  of the relationship  between runoff r and the  input x  is
represented  by a  stochastic  runoff function,  g:R3 -> R,  with  r = g(x, w, c).  Here,  £  is  a
random variable representing the regulator's uncertainty about actual runoff. The agency's
joint density for c and w is given by f(w, 6).  The expected runoff generated by the input x
is
r(x)= Jg(x, w, e)f(w, e)dw de.
Runoff causes  water  quality  damage,  D(r);  we  assume  that  D  is  convex  and  twice
continuously differentiable  in r. The expected  damage caused by the vector x is
4For example, Lee and Misolek  show that optimal emission taxes generally  will not equal marginal pollution damages when
the revenue collected can  reduce deadweight losses elsewhere  in the economy. We extend this analysis  to the NPS setting.
'The  major difference  is  that we view the farmer as having only one (polluting) input. This assumption  is made only to keep
the notation  simple. Assuming that  x is multidimensional  and will  leave our  results unchanged;  in  this case, all operations
performed on x are vector operations.
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D(x) = JD(g(x, w, E))f(w, e)dw de.
Given knowledge of 0 and no transaction costs, the first-best (ex ante efficient) choice
ofx maximizes
n(x, 0)-  D(x),
and solves the following first-order condition:
nx(X,0)-D'(x)=  O,
where  e1l is the partial derivative of the farmer's profit with respect to input x, and D'(x)
is the derivative of expected damages with respect to input x. The first-best problem can be
viewed as one in which the regulator observes the farmer's private  information costlessly
and requires  the farmer to choose  the socially optimal  input bundle  or else be assessed an
extremely large fine.7
Direct Revelation  Incentive Schemes  Regulating Input Use
When the regulator does not observe 0 the knife-edged instrument just described is unavail-
able. In what follows, we assume both asymmetric information over 0 and the presence of
transaction costs and develop the properties of optimal incentive  schemes. Currently there
are  two  general  approaches  to  choosing  such  incentive  schemes  (leading to  equivalent
optimal allocations):  nonlinear pricing techniques (Maskin and Riley; Chambers;  Lee) and
truthful direct revelation  (TDR) mechanisms (Guesnerie and Laffont;  Laffont and Tirole). 8
This article  follows the TDR mechanism approach. 9
One of the distinguishing features  of a direct revelation  mechanism  is that an "agent"
(farmer)  announces  his  private  information  (efficiency  parameters)  to  a  "principal"  (the
regulator).  See Myerson (1989)  for a general discussion of direct revelation mechanisms.  In
the  direct revelation mechanism (incentive  scheme)  considered  here,  the  regulator  an-
nounces a contract  schedule  {t, x}  that maps farmer types  into tax and input levels.  After
observing the incentive scheme the farmer reports a type to'the government. The government
observes  the  farmer's reported type2 denoted  0,  and pursuant  to the  announced  contract
schedule, offers him the contract (t(O), x(0)).
Typically  the mechanism design  literature  focuses  its attention on the class of mecha-
nisms that maximize social welfare  and are both truthful  and voluntary. The mechanism  is
truthful  if it is optimal  for the  farmer  to report  0  truthfully  (i.e.,  report  0 = 0), and the
7This type of instrument is often referred  to as a knife-edged instrument.
8Guesnerie and Laffont show that nonlinear pricing  rules and truthful direct revelation  mechanisms are equivalent resource
allocation  devices (Proposition  1, p. 335).
9The  information  requirements  for  implementing  a direct-revelation  scheme  are potentially  demanding.  For  instance,  to
implement  the direct revelation  tax scheme considered  here,  the government  must know the structure  of the profit function
and the distribution of 0.
Several authors have shown that nothing is lost when modeling a mechanism as a TDR mechanism (see Dasgupta, Hammond,
and Maskin;  Holmstrom;  Myerson  1989). This observation-called  the revelation  principle-says that for any equilibrium of
any general  mechanism there exists an equivalent direct-revelation  mechanism that involves truth telling.
280  December 1995Transaction Costs and Water Pollution Control  281
mechanism is voluntary if the farmer is better off choosing a contract (voluntarily) than not
choosing one. As for social welfare, recall that a major difference between S-D's model and
the  model  presented  here  is that we  assume  the regulator  incurs  transaction  costs  when
raising  tax  revenues.  We  model  the  effect  of transaction  costs  on  net tax  revenues  by
assuming  the  regulator  realizes  only  X  cents  from  each  dollar  the  farmer  is  taxed,
0 < X < 1. If X  is equal to one, then there are no transaction costs. For a given 0, the expected
profit to the farmer is  l(x, 0) - t and the expected net social cost is  Xt - D(x). Hence, the
net social welfare associated with a type-0 farmer is
B(x(O), t(0), 0) =  (x(0  ), 0) - D(x(  )) - (1 -)t(),
where k is  equal to one  in the S-D case.  Given that  n  is strictly  concave  in x and D  is
convex in x,  it follows that  B(..)  is strictly concave  in x.
Let  (O,0) = n(x(O),O)-  t(O).  Given  the  social  welfare  function  B,  truth  telling  is
ensured if the following incentive compatibility constraint is introduced:
(1)  0 eargmax6{r7  (,0)},  VO,  e ®.
Voluntary participaton  is ensured if the following individual rationality  constraint  is intro-
duced:
(2)  7r(0,0)>Ž,  VO,0  e  ,
where, without loss of generality,  we set i  equal to 0.10
The regulator's second-best problem (SB)  is to choose  {x(0),  t(0)} to solve
max m }  ,(  fB(x(Q),  t(6),  )k(O)  dOQ
s.t.  (l)and  (2).
(SB)  is  a  standard  problem  in  the  literature  on  designing  mechanisms  under  private
(asymmetric)  information  (Guesnerie  and Laffont;  Chambers).  Typically,  before  actually
solving  this  problem,  the  analyst  transforms  the  incentive  compatibility  and  individual
rationality constraints  into simpler forms.
Incentive Compatibility  and  Individual Rationality
Guesnerie  and Laffont show that equation  (1) will be satisfied if and only if:
d(3)  x(,(,)l:^  =n,(x(A),9)x'(6)-^()=o,
and
cflt is,  of course, possible that the optimum  involves driving the farmer out of business, but we do not consider this degenerate
case further.
Smith, TomasiJournal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
(4)  x'()  > O.
For a proof see Guesnerie  and Laffont.  Here,  t  ( )I|  is the partial derivative of 7t  with
respect  to  0  (evaluated  at  0 =0)  and  is  the  first-order  condition  for  truth  telling,  and
x'( )  and t'(.) are the respective derivatives of the input and tax functions. Equation (3) says
that the input and tax functions must be chosen  so that the marginal benefit  from  lying a
little-for  example,  reporting  0 = 92 + d  -is  just offset by the  marginal  cost of lying a
little; the marginal benefit is n  x'  and the marginal cost is t'. Equation (4) results from the
assumption that [n  is greater than or equal to zero and, as shown in Guesnerie and Laffont,
comes from the second-order condition for truth telling.  Given that profits are nondecreasing
in 0 , (4) says that a profitable (efficient) farmer should be allocated at least as much of the
input as less profitable ones. Equation (4)  is often called the monotonicity condition.
To  see  why truthful  revelation  requires  a  nondecreasing  input function  consider  the
farmer's marginal rate of substitution between x and t.  By rearranging  the terms  in (3)  this
is
dt (5)  n  , 0).
dx
The regulator can use its knowledge of n  to choose the incentive  scheme as a function  of
the units of x used and does this by setting the change  in the tax given a change  in x equal
to the marginal quasi-rent of the input.
Suppose for the moment that the farmer is one of two possible types: 02 or 01,  02  >01.
In figure  1, two isoprofit lines pass through contract A = (t, x,). I' is an isoprofit line for the
type-0'  profit line for the type-02 farmer. By assumption the slope of/2 is everywhere steeper
than that of I.  Note that profits increase in the southeast direction.  A type-0 2 farmer (or a
type-0  farmer)  has isoprofit line I  (or I'). To get a type-0  2farmer to report 0 truthfully, the
regulator needs to offer another contract somewhere to the right of A and above I'; one such
contract being the point B. At B the farmer is better off reporting 0  . (If B were on  2  then
truthful reporting is still an optimal response, although  it is not unique.)  To keep the farmer
from reporting type 0'  when it is really 02, the regulator makes sure that two things happen.
First,  the marginal  increase  in t for the type-0 2farmer,  given a marginal  increase  in x,  is
larger  than  the marginal  increase  in  t that keeps  a type-0  farmer  on I'  (given the  same
marginal  increase  in x).  Second, the marginal  increase  in t for the type-02 farmer, given  a
marginal  increase  in x,  is less than the marginal  increase  in t that keeps the type-0 2farmer
on  2.
If the input function violates (4) the tax  scheme will not encourage truth telling by the
farmer.  To see this, assume that the contract targeted for the type-0 2 farmer is to the left of
A and below I/-contract C, for example  (i.e., the input function is decreasing  in 0 ). Then
the  type-0  farmer  has no  incentive  to report  0 truthfully.  In  this case,  she would  report
= 02  and receive contract C; placing her on the higher isoprofit curve I'.
The  individual  rationality  constraint  requires  that  the tax  scheme  does  not  leave  the
farmer with negative profits. Since this must hold for all possible farmer types (2) must hold
for each possible value of 0.  This set of rationality constraints can be replaced by a single
constraint.  By (3) and the envelope theorem, truth telling implies
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Tax level
Input level
Figure 1.  The monotonicity  condition  and truth telling
(6)  d ~~-i(,)  V4(),(6) )x'()  t'()  +  o (e  =  (x(),  0'()  - ( o )+(x()),  ).
dO
By assumption,  no (x(O), 0)  > 0.  So it follows that 7n (,  0)  is increasing in 0  and (2) holds
as long as:
(7)  7(0,0)  =  0."
The farmer cal  always  say that he is a type-0  farmer and get
n (O,  )  = n(x(O), 0)-  t()  > n(x(O), o)-t(o)= r(o,o)=o.
tl
t3 3
x3 x 1 x2
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Optimal Incentive Schemes  under Asymmetric  Information and Transaction Costs
In this section we develop the regulator's optimal incentive scheme given transaction costs
and  asymmetric  information  over  the  farmer's type.  We  proceed  by  first setting up the
regulator's optimization problem. Then we develop the optimal input function and end with
a characterization of the optimal tax function.
It can  be  shown that the  second-best problem can  be rewritten  as  an optimal  control
problem with the slope of the input function, x'(  ), being the control variable. Specifically,
the second-best problem (SB)  is equivalent to the following optimal control problem:




t(0) satisfies (4), and x(0) > 0;
where
W(x(O), O)  =  1(x(O),  ) + Z(o,  )ne o(x(O),  ) - D(x(O)),
and
Z(O  X)-=(1-  · )[1 -K(O)]
[  k(0)  '
For a proof see Guesnerie and Laffont, p. 360. The expression  W(x, 0)  is the expected net
social benefit of using x units of the input and  kn(.-) + Z( -)Io (. )  is another representation
of farmer profits.  Finally,  the term (1  - K(O))  l  k(O)  is the  inverse of the hazard rate: the
probability that the farmer's type belongs to [0,0 + dO] given that his type is not less than 0 .
Assumption 2:  W(x, 0) is strictly concave in x.
Assumption 2 ensures that the optimal  input function is unique.
The Hamiltonian associated with the above optimal control problem  is
H = W(x(O), O)k(O)  + [ (0) +y (0)]k ()k(0).
The costate variable,  |i(0), represents the marginal expected  net benefit to society of using
x(0 )k(0) units of the polluting input. The multiplier function y (0) is the expected marginal
net benefit of relaxing the incentive compatibility constraint. The necessary conditions for
an optimum include
-H.  = -Wx(x(O),  )k(O)  =  '(0),
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(9)  H(p  =[(0  ) + y (0)]k(O)= 0,
(10)  H, = H  =(p(O)k(O),
(11)  Lt(  )(p(9)=Y (0)(P(0)=0,
and the transversality condition:
(12)  t(0)= 0.
Choosing the Optimal Input Function
We construct  the optimal  input function  in two  steps. In the first step we  solve the above
optimal control problem  while ignoring  the monotonicity  constraint on  {x},  equation  (4).
This  step gives  us  the  unrestricted inputfunction, denoted  {x**}.  In  the second  step we
inspect the unrestricted  input function to see if there are any subintervals of 0  over which
(4) is violated.  Among other things, we show that if  x**'(0)  0 for all 0,  then the optimal
input function,  denoted  {x*},  is identical  to  {x**}.  The  second step (discussed  shortly) is
required if there are any intervals of  x**'}  over which equation (4) is violated.
The First  Step in Choosing an Optimal Input Function. Given that  p(0)  = x'(0)  is the
control,  if the  monotonicity  constraint  is  ignored  the  necessary  condition  (9)  becomes
H,( =  t(0O)k()  = 0, or Li(0)  = 0. So, integrating (8) between 0  and 0  and using (12)  gives
_  ~0
(13)  (Q)-  (0) =  W(x*(s),s)k(s)ds =0,
0
where
(14)  Wx(x** (),0)=  IxH(x**(O),0)+  Z(0, X)nFx(x**(0),O)-  D'(x**()).
Equation (13)  says that the unrestricted input function must be chosen so that the expected
marginal benefit from using x*(0) units of input is equal to the expected marginal damage
it causes. Given that  W is strictly concave  in x, the input profile satisfying  (13)  is unique.
Equation (13)  holds only if Wx(x(), 0) = 0  for all 0  in  [0,0].  Hence, the regulator must
choose the unrestricted input function so that  Wx (x, 0) = 0  for all 0  [0, 0].
After choosing the unrestricted input function  {x**}  the regulator checks to see if there
are any subintervals of ® over which  {x**} violates the monotonicity constraint, (4). To see
how the unrestricted input function behaves, we take the total derivative of (14)  with respect
to 0  and isolate the x  (0)  term by itself:
(15)  x*  (0)  (x + z  )-  +zoxo
Hn,  -D''+  znLx
The denominator in (15)  is simply the second derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to
x  and  is  negative  by  Assumption  2.  So  {x**}  is  nonnegative  only  if (X +Z 0)nx0
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+ZHI  Oyx  > 0. Given that there are no restrictions imposed on Z and  I 0 x 0, it is impossible to
tell whether  {x  } is decreasing (or increasing) over ®, or increasing over some subintervals
of 0  and constant or decreasing over others.
Before  discussing the second  step, we  make the following  four observations.  First,  in
S-D the regulator incurs zero transaction costs, that is, X = 1. With zero transactions costs,
(15) is given by:
**'(9)  =  x  0,  V0  t  E. x  (0)  -lx  VO  .
With zero transaction costs (k = 1) the monotonicity condition is satisfied over the entire
domain ofx, implying that the monotonicity condition can be ignored. If so, then the optimal
input function is equivalent to the unrestricted input function. Also, by (14)  the input function
satisfies the condition for efficiency (when  = 1 ). Moreover, when  X = 1 and n
1 1x  > 0,  the
monotonicity  condition implies that each possible report of the farmer's type is assigned a
different input level, so an input standard cannot be optimal. These results accord with those
of S-D.
Second,  as suggested  in the previous  paragraph,  even if h <1,  if the unrestricted  input
function  is  increasing  over  its  entire  domain,  then  the  optimal  input  function  and  the
unrestricted  input function  are equivalent.  Sufficient conditions for a nondecreasing  unre-
stricted input function are
[X + Z  (O,  )]Lno (x(o),  ) + z(e, X )n,,O (x(0),  )>  0,  v  eO.
Third,  in the presence  of transaction costs,  ex ante  efficient pollution levels  cannot be
attained.  Ex ante efficiency  requires that input levels be chosen so that marginal profits are
equal to marginal damages (nx = D'). By (14)  this condition will never hold when X is less
than 1.
Finally,  if the unrestricted  input  function  is  everywhere  decreasing,  then  the optimal
function  must be  a constant  function.  In other  words, the  optimal  incentive  scheme  is a
standard. To understand this claim recall that the unrestricted input function must satisfy the
following (for all 0  e o):
o  0
ip()  =  Jp'(s)ds  =  W,(x(s), s)ds =0.
o  0
Given that x' =(p, equation  (11)  can be rewritten as:
(p()i(9)=  x*(0)J Wx(s),s)ds  = 0.
Since the (unrestricted) input function satisfying ,I(0)  = 0  is unique, if it is strictly decreasing
then  it cannot  be the optimal input function,  {x*}  {x** }. Given that the bracketed term  is
equal to zero only if x* = x**,  the term  (p(90)i(0)  is equal  to zero only if xc*  is the zero
function, implying x*(0) = x  for all 0 E [60,0]; the regulator  implements a standard.
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The  Second Step  in  Choosing an Optimal Input Function. If the  unrestricted  input
function is increasing on some subintervals of ® and decreasing on others, then the optimal
input function  will be a  connected  function composed  of (a) (increasing)  portions of the
unrestricted input function and (b) constant functions (line segments). The subintervals over
which the optimal input function is constant is equivalent to a standard. The regulator will
choose standards for some, but not necessarily for all, farmer types. The second step involves
determining exactly when farmer types will be regulated using standards (bunched).
Guesnerie  and Laffont observed the unrestricted  input function might assume a myriad
of potential  shapes. However, for a discussion on how to choose the optimal input function
when the monotonicity  constraint is violated we direct the reader's attention to figure 2. In
figure 2 the unrestricted input function is represented by the curve abcdefg. This unrestricted
input function is increasing on the intervals [,  0 2]  and [04,0 ] and decreasing on the interval
[0 2,0 4  ]. In this case, the optimal input function will include an interval like [0,  5] where
the  value  of the  optimal  input  function  is  equal  to  a  constant  value  x°,  for  all  0  in
[01,05 ]. A farmer reporting  any type in this subinterval will be allowed to use x° units of
the input; thus, the optimal regulatory scheme is a standard in this interval. The optimal input
function x  , then, would look something like the heavy curve abdfg:  increasing from 0  to
0  , constant between [01,05],  and increasing  from  5 to 0  to.
The constant function is determined by choosing the values  x°, 01, and 05  to solve the
following  problem:
05
f,(x, 0 )k(0)dO = 0,
07
x° =X  (03);  X ° =x  *(0).
Here we have three equations and three unknowns x°, 0 7, and 0 5. The top equation says that
the parameters are chosen so the expected marginal net benefit of input usage (conditioned
on 0  being between  07 and 0 5) is zero.  For complete details on choosing these values see
Guesnerie  and Laffont or Fudenberg and Tirole (pp. 303-6).
The Optimal Price  Function
Once  the optimal input function  has been chosen, determining  the optimal tax function  is
straightforward.  First integrate (7) between 0  and 0  to obtain the following:
0
7(0,0)- 7(0_,)  =  n  (x(s),s)ds.
0
Since n(0, 0)= 0, we have
0
c (0,0)  =  J  n 0)  (x(s), s)ds =  (x(0), 0 - t().
0
Substituting x  for x and solving for t, we get the optimal input tax function:





0 1  0 2  0 3  0 4  0 5  Type
Figure 2.  Choosing the optimal input function
0
t*()  =I(x*  (),0)  - J  (x*(s),s)ds.
0
The optimal tax is equal to the farmer's  true profit less J no (.)ds.  The integral component
of the tax results from the farmer's private information and is the minimum amount she must
be paid to reveal her true 0.  A farmer who reports a true type equal to the lower bound of
possible types makes zero profits.  If the true type is interior to ® then the farmer earns an
additional "information rent" and the value of that rent is equal to the minimum amount he
must be paid to reveal his true type.  To interpret  this result, observe that the farmer's total
profits increase at a rate equal to rio(.). The potential gain to a farmer with 0 = 0° - A (with
A > 0) from choosing the contract designed for a type-0 ° farmer is approximately  equal to
frl  ()A.  To induce truthful  revelation of 0,  the approximate  difference  in the amount the
farmer is taxed, t'(.)A,  must just offset the potential benefit of misrepresenting  his true 0.
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Conclusion
In this article we  reconsider  the single-farm model of Shortle and Dunn and demonstrate
that their results depend  critically  on an implicit assumption  that there are no transaction
costs  involved  in tax implementation.  When  such transaction  costs are  introduced to the
model,  we  show  that  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  achieve  the  ex  ante  efficient  level  of
agricultural pollution.  Moreover,  in some cases,  the optimal regulatory  policy  consists of
management  standards.
Shortle  and  Dunn  also  consider  the  problem  of controlling  pollution  from  multiple
polluters. An extension of our approach to this case involves some complications that await
further research.  In particular,  in this case the contract and, hence,  the payoffs to any one
farmer will depend on the messages  and true types of all of them.  We must then consider
the type of equilibrium notion most appropriate to the model. However, this line of research
is promising for providing insight into how the regulation of heterogeneous emitters would
be altered when the regulator can receive information from firms about their types.
In our article, as well as in that by Shortle and Dunn, it is assumed that, while the farmer
has private information regarding her profit function, the regulator could monitor the inputs
used. Thus, while there is adverse selection,  there is no moral hazard. A number of papers
in  the NPS  literature  have  considered the  moral  hazard  problem  (e.g.,  Segerson;  Xepa-
padeas).  Preliminary  work on the case where both  forms of asymmetric  information  are
present has been recently undertaken by Laffont.
In general,  the problem of controlling NPS pollution  is a vexing one for policy makers
because  of the  diversity  of informational  deficiencies  involved.  Yet,  the problem  is  an
important one to investigate,  given that NPS  pollution remains a major source of environ-
mental degradation.  While the practical  application of the kinds of incentive  schemes  we
derive here has yet to be demonstrated, the derivation of their properties and the parameters
they depend on is a vital prerequisite  to their implementation.
[Received December 1994; final version received  August 1995.]
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